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Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Based On An
Insurer's Duty To Defend: The Adoption
Of The Seider Rule In California
Recent years have seen a liberalization of the procedural rules
whereby a party is able to obtain jurisdiction in actions involving
nonresident defendants. A California court has gone to the limits
of this liberalization in holding that a California resident may ob-
tain quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by at-
taching the contractual obligation owed Jo him by an insurance
company doing business in California. This comment examines
the effect of that decision and questions its validity with respect to
a defendant who has no other contact with the forum state. It
is pointed out that under such a decision a defendant may be
bound to personal liability in excess of the property attached. It
is also pointed out that this decision, coupled with interpretations
of prior case law, may result in a choice of forum which is inher-
ently unfair and subject to constitutional infirmities. The author rec-
ommends legislation or re-interpretation of case law which would
provide needed safeguards for the nonresident defendant.
On January 3, 1973, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of Sacramento County in the case of Turner v. Evers' held that a
California resident may obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction z over a non-
resident defendant by attaching the contractual obligation owed to him
1. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973).
2. Proceedings quasi in rem litigate the interests in property of a person who is
himself outside the court's jurisdiction. A judgment obtained in this type of proceeding
is not binding on the defendant beyond his interests in that particular property. One
type of proceeding quasi in rem involves the assertion by the plaintiff of a claim in the
property itself as against another claimant who is outside the court's jurisdiction.
In the second type of quasi in rem proceeding, the plaintiff asserts no interest in the
property except as to satisfy a personal claim against a defendant over whom the
forum state has no personal jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAws, Introductory Note §§56-68, at 191 (1971). It is with the latter quasi in
rem proceeding that this comment is concerned.
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by an insurance company doing business in California. In so holding,
the court became the first state court to follow the controversial rule
set forth in the New York Court of Appeals decision of Seider v.
Roth.'
The Seider procedure of attaching the insurer's obligation to defend
the nonresident as a means of obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction has
aroused much criticism.4 In view of this criticism, it is likely that
the recent Turner decision will be challenged.5
This comment will discuss five areas of concern that arise from
the attachment procedure authorized by Seider: (1) the validity of
characterizing the insurance policy obligation to defend as a debt
or property subject to attachment; (2) the effect on the Seider proce-
dure of constitutional limitations on prejudgment attachment; (3) the
necessity of allowing the defendant to make a limited appearance to
contest the action; (4) the role of forum non conveniens as a method
of alleviating undue hardship on the nonresident defendant; and (5)
the possibility of a direct action against the insurer as an alternative
to the Seider procedure.
THE BACKGROUND TO TURNER V. EvERS
Traditionally, the existence of quasi in rem jurisdiction has de-
pended on the presence of property of a nonresident within the forum
state.6  Hence, it is necessary to establish the situs of the property
in question to determine if it is capable of being brought under the
control of the state seeking to assert jurisdiction over it.7
The situs of tangible property, real or personal, may be determined
without difficulty; jurisdiction may be asserted wherever the property
is located.8 Intangibles evidenced by a document such as stocks,
bonds, negotiable instruments, and securities are, as a general rule,
3. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
4. Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentary, Parts 1-1/111, N.Y. CPLR §5201
(McKinney Supp. 1972). See generally Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability
Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1075 (1968); Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional
Phase, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 58 (1968).
5. The small recovery in the present case makes it unlikely that it will be
appealed further. It is quite foreseeable, however, that a subsequent case involving a
more substantial claim will challenge the holding of Turner v. Evers.
6. The nexus between the nonresident and the state seeking to assert jurisdic-
tion was provided by the assumption that "property is always in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent ...... Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877).
7. It is stated in Pennoyer that the res must be "brought under the control of
the court by seizure or some equivalent act." Id. at 727. The methods by which con-
trol over property may be asserted are statutory, the most common being attachment
and garnishment. See Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment
of a Debt, 27 HAav. L. REv. 107, 109-12 (1913).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§59, 60 (1971).
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deemed to be situated where the document is located.9
Establishing the situs of a debt presents more complex theoretical
problems. 10 The United States Supreme Court's holding in Harris
v. Balk" established that a debt may be garnished wherever personal
jurisdiction can be obtained over the debtor. 2 While Harris has been
criticized,' 3 it has never been overruled. However, the characterization
of an insurance company's obligation to defend as a debt and thus,
under the rule of Harris v. Balk, attachable wherever the company
is doing business extended the concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction
to limits previously uncontemplated.
This is precisely the reasoning followed in Seider v. Roth. In Seider
the plaintiffs, New York residents, and defendant, a resident of Que-
bec, were involved in an automobile accident in Vermont. The de-
fendant had no contact with New York on which to base in personam
jurisdiction.' 4 Thus in order to sue in the New York courts,' 5 plain-
tiffs sought to attach the obligations of the Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Company to defend and indemnify under a policy of insur-
ance issued to the defendant in Canada. Hartford was licensed to
do business in New York.
The New York Court of Appeals, per Chief Judge Desmond, af-
firmed the lower courts ' 6 denials of defendant's motion to vacate the
attachment and quash service of process. In so doing, it held that
"[jurisdiction is properly acquired by that attachment since the policy
obligation is a debt owed to the defendant by the insurer, the latter
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFIcT o LAWS §63 (1971). See Andrews, Si-
tus of Intangibles in Suits Against Non-Resident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939).
10. Since a debt is "not a thing at all.. . but merely the legal power of getting a
thing from the debtor," it can theoretically be said to have no situs. Beale, supra
note 7, at 114-15.
11. 198 U.S. 215 (1945).
12. "The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him
wherever he goes." Id. at 222.
13. See, e.g., Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and
the Interstate Corporation, 68 COLum. L. REv. 550, 562-71 (1967).
14. In general, the bases on which a state may assert jurisdiction over the person
of a defendant are (1) presence, residence, or domicile within the state, (2) state
citizenship, (3) consent to the exercise of jurisdiction or an appearance in an action
brought in the state, and (4) a contact with the state sufficient for the exercise of
jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLICr op' LAws §§28-39 (1971). In
personam jurisdiction, in contrast to jurisdiction quasi in rem (see note 2 supra), binds
the defendant personally to the payment of a judgment rendered against him.
15. Suit could have been brought in Quebec, defendant's domicile, or in Vermont,
the place of the accident.
16. The defendant's motion to vacate the attachment and the personal service of
the summons and complaint was denied by the Supreme Court at Special Term,
Nassau County. This ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court, Second Department, and, upon permission for appeal granted by the Supreme
Court Appellate Division, the case was brought before the Court of Appeals of New
York.
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being regarded as a resident of this State .... -17 Thus under the
holding of Seider, quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant may be
obtained in any state where personal jurisdiction may be obtained over
the defendant's insurer.'
8
While a second New York case following soon after Seider reaf-
firmed the ruling,19 federal district courts reached contrary decisions
20
before the Seider rule was finally upheld by the United States Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit, in Minichiello v. Rosenberg.2' Neverthe-
less, Seider and its New York progeny did not resolve the controversy
for the rest of the country. Seider received, in the words of Judge
Friendly, "a poor press from the commentators" 22 who felt that quasi
in rem jurisdiction had been carried beyond the bounds of reason. 28
Several jurisdictions, when presented with the opportunity, declined
to follow Seider.
24
The Sacramento Superior Court in Turner v. Evers chose not only
to accept the reasoning of Seider but to apply the procedure when
the injury sustained was not to the plaintiffs' persons but to their prop-
erty. The specific facts of the case were as follows: California resi-
dents Lisa and John Turner took their automobile to a service station
operated by the defendant Robert Evers in Tacoma, Washington. The
plaintiffs claimed that after the car was released to them it was driven
only three miles before becoming totally inoperative. They sought
to recover damages for repairs and loss of use under the theories of
breach of contract, fraud, and negligence.
The business transaction and damage occurred entirely in Washing-
ton, and defendant Evers had no contacts with California on which
to base personal jurisdiction. He was, however, insured by the Travel-
17. 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102, 216 N.E.2d at 315.
18. Later cases limited the availability of the Seider procedure to plaintiffs who
were residents of New York. Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969); Vaage v. Lewis, 29 A.D.2d 315, 288
N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dept. 1968).
19. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 234 N.E.2d 669
(1967), motion for reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 238 N.E.2d
319 (1968).
20. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York re-
jected the Seider rule in Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Thereafter, the District Courts for the Western District and the Northern District
ruled contra but, recognizing the discrepancy, determined that their rulings "involve[d]
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion," 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (1970), and appeals were permitted by the U.S. Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit.
21. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
22. Id. at 108.
23. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 4.
24. State ex rel. Government Employees Insurance Company v. Lasky, 454 S.W.
2d 942 (Mo. App. 1970); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970);
DeRenti's v. Lewis, 258 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1969); Housley v. Anaconda Company,
19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967).
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ers Indemnity Company which is licensed to do business in California.
The plaintiffs obtained a writ of attachment25 directing that Travelers'
contractual obligations to defend and indemnify be attached and served
summons on Evers by mail in Washington. Defendant's motion to
quash26 was granted by the Municipal Court. Upon appeal, the Su-
perior Court reversed this ruling and followed the procedure set forth
in Seider v. Roth.
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE SEIDER PROCEDURE
A. Characterization of the Insurer's Obligations
A fundamental and recurring objection to the reasoning in Seider
is that expressed by Judge Burke in his dissent.2" Burke argued that
the insurer's obligation to defend does not arise until an action is
brought against the insured. Before such time, the obligation is
contingent and thus not an attachable debt under the New York
law.28 Since an action cannot be commenced before jurisdiction over
the defendant is obtained, the attachment of the obligation in order
to obtain jurisdiction, thereby eliminating the contingency, was termed
"circular ratiocination. 29  Professor Siegel, a perseverant critic of the
Seider rule, referred to this approach as "bootstrap reasoning.1
30
To the extent that the Seider holding characterized the attachment
of the insurer's obligation to defend as a debt, this contention has
validity. It is arguable, however, that the Seider court intended to
characterize the inchoate obligation as being within the broader term
"property." Certainly the attachment of either debts or property is
allowable under the New York statutes.31 While it is true that the
25. Previously, the Code of Civil Procedure provided that a plaintiff "may have
property of the defendant attached, except earnings . . . as provided in Section 690.6,
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment recovered ... [i]n an action upon a
contract, express or implied, against a defendant not residing in this state ....
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §537(1), repealed, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §2, at 941.
The new code sections permit the attachment of all property of a nonresident defend-
ant in an action for the recovery of money. CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. §§537, 537.1-
537.3, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §§3-5, at 942-43.
26. The motion was treated as a motion to quash the attachment, i.e., an asser-
tion that the property attached was not subject to attachment. See note 93 infra.
27. 17 N.Y.2d at 116, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103, 216 N.E.2d at 315.
28. N.Y. CPLR §§5201(a) and 6202 (McKinney 1963) authorize the attach-
ment of a debt "which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon
demand of the judgment debtor . . . ." Thus an obligation which is contingent, i.e.,
not certain to become due, is not attachable.
29. 17 N.Y.2d at 116, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103, 216 N.E.2d at 315.
30. Siegel, supra note 4, at 70.
31. N.Y. CPLR §§5201(a) and 6202 (McKinney 1963) authorize the attach-
ment of a noncontingent debt (see note 28 supra); N.Y. CPLR §5201(b), in conjunc-
tion with N.Y. CPLR §6202, authorizes the attachment of "any property which could
be assigned or transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or interest
and whether or not it is vested ... .
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attachment was held to be proper because "the policy obligation is
a debt owed to the defendant,"3 2 Judge Desmond also stated that the
basic question to be decided is "whether Hartford's contractual obliga-
tion to defendant is a debt or cause of action such as may be at-
tached. 33  Moreover, in discussing the obligations of the insurer, the
judge noted that the policy agreement obligated the insurer to investi-
gate and, if expedient, to negotiate and settle with the claimant, as
well as to pay thel medical expenses of any persons injured in the
accident. The latter duties accrue upon notice of the accident, even
if a suit is never brought.34
In Simpson v. Loehmann35 the court referred to the debt in the
Seider case as a "property right in the defendant" sufficient to support
jurisdiction over him. 6 The same court in Glassman v. Hyder 7 stated
that both the Seider and Simpson decisions "depend upon the construc-
tion that an indemnitor's duty to defend is a present duty and, therefore,
a current asset. '38  It is further noted in Glassman that the Seider
and Simpson opinions make "no special effort . . . to classify con-
tractual duties as between debt and property."3 9
Whatever the specific holding of Seider was intended to be with
respect to the characterization of the insurer's obligation, the necessity
of engaging in "bootstrap" reasoning to sustain the attachment in
Turner is absent. The insurer's obligations under the policy were
expressly characterized by the court not as a debt, but as property
of the defendant.40
California distinguishes between a garnishee as custodian of a de-
fendant's property and as a debtor of the defendant.41  A garnish-
ment must be directed specifically to property, money, or chattels un-
der a garnishee's control or to an indebtedness from the garnishee
to the defendant.42  In Gow v. Mdrshall,4 for example, an attach-
men 4 notice that mentioned only credits created no liability on the
32. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102, 216 N.E.2d at 315.
33. Id. at 114, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101, 216 N.E.2d at 315.
34. Id. at 114, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101, 216 N.E.2d at 314.
35. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 234 N.E.2d 669 (1967), motion for
reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 238 N.E.2d 319 (1968).
36. Id. at 308, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636, 234 N.E.2d at 671.
37. 23 N.Y.2d 354, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783, 244 N.E.2d 259 (1968).
38. Id. at 358, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 786, 244 N.E.2d at 261.
39. Id.
40. Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal App. 3d Supp. 11, 19, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390, 396
(1973).
41. Clyne v. Easton, Eldridge & Co., 148 Cal. 287, 83 P. 36 (1905); Bowie v.
Union Bank, 11 Cal. App. 3d 807, 90 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1970).
42. 148 Cal. at 293-94, 83 P. at 38.
43. 90 Cal. 565, 27 P. 422 (1891).
44. Although the term attachment properly refers to the seizure of tangible
property whereas garnishment is the proper procedure when (1) the property of a
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part of a garnishee for a debt. In Clyne v. Easton, Eldridge & Co."
a debt was found not to be included in a notice of attachment which
contained the general term "effects." The writ of attachment in the
Turner case, however, directed that the insurer's obligation to defend
be attached as property of the defendant.46 Thus it cannot be asserted
that the plaintiff intended to treat Travelers as the garnishee of a debt.
The characterization of the insurer's obligation as property can be
supported under California statutes. Section 537 of the Code of
Civil Procedure formerly provided that in an action against a nonresi-
dent defendant upon a contract or for the recovery of money damages
arising from injury, death, or damage to property, the plaintiff "may
have the property of the defendant attached . . . as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered." Sections 537,
537.1, 537.2, and 537.3, as recently enacted, provide that in any
action for the recovery of a sum of $500 or more against a nonresi-
dent defendant, the plaintiff may attach "all property of the defend-
aut.I
'47
Section 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that "unless other-
wise apparent from the context . . . [tihe word 'property' includes
both real and personal property" and that "[tihe words 'personal prop-
erty' include money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences
of debt." California courts, in keeping with general rules of con-
struction, have interpreted the term "property" in accordance with
the meaning and intent of the context in which it is used.48  Thus
the examples of personal property listed in Section 17 are not exhaus-
tive.
An often quoted interpretation of the term property as used in the
Code of Civil Procedure is. that of the California Supreme Court
nonresident defendant is under the control of a third person or (2) the seizure is of
a debt owed the defendant, see 1 WrrmN, CALiFoRnA Pnocmupr, Jurisdiction §§151,
152 (2d ed. 1970), the terms are often used interchangeably.
45. 148 Cal. 287, 83 P. 36 (1905).
46. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 14, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
47. S.B. 1048, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, at 941, effective March 7, 1973, re-
pealed former Sections 537, 538, 541, and 542(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure and
amended former Sections 537.5 and 539. The new law added the following sections to
the Code of Civil Procedure: 537, 537.1, 537.2, 537.3, 538, 538.1-538.5, 541, 542.1-
542.4, 542b, and 542c.
48. See Estate of Glassford, 114 Cal. App. 2d 181, 249 P.2d 908 (1952) ("prop-
erty" held to be interchangeable with "estate" for purposes of ancillary probate juris-
diction); Bogan v. Wiley, 90 Cal. App. 2d 288, 202 P.2d 824 (1949) ("property of a
decedent" held to exclude choses in action under Probate Code section concerning the
embezzlement of property); People v. Settles, 29 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 781, 78 P.2d 274
(1938) (the right of the winner of a game to play further games without charge
held to be personal property); Houghton v. Pacific Southwest Trust & Savings Bank,
111 Cal. App. 509, 295 P. 1079 (1931) (the right to receive funds from the eventual
sale of real property placed in trust held to be personal property).
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in Ponsonby v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands.49 This court held
that property, as used in a predecessor of the current code Section
537,50 was used in an "unqualified" sense "sufficiently comprehensive
to include every species of estate, both real and personal, whether
choate or inchoate, whether corporeal or incorporeal." 1  While the
Ponsonby court was making a determination as to what constituted
an "injury to property" for purposes of instigating an attachment, 2
it must be assumed, as Judge Goldberg points out in Turner,"3 that
the term is to have a similar meaning when referring to property sub-
ject to attachment.54 The rights of an insured to a defense under
a policy of insurance can clearly be considered property when the
term is this broadly defined.
By relying solely on its characterization of the insurer's obligation
as property, however, the Turner court ignored the approach of the
California Supreme Court in the 1957 case of Atkinson v. Superior
Court.55 This case held that a contested obligation of an employer
to make payments to a plaintiff under a collective bargaining agree-
ment was property within the meaning of Section 17 of the Code
of Civil Procedure sufficient for the state to obtain jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant. The factual situation of Atkinson is distin-
guishable from that of Turner. In Atkinson the plaintiffs sought to
litigate the defendant's interest in the very property in question,
whereas in Turner the plaintiffs' only interest in the attached property
was as satisfaction for their personal claim against the defendant.50
The Atkinson court specifically stated, however, that this factual dis-
tinction was not a relevant factor in its determination that the contested
obligation was property for purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction.57
What the Atkinson court did consider to be relevant in making
its determination were the local contacts of the defendant with the
state in relation to affecting "overall fair play and substantial justice."58
49. 210 Cal. 229, 291 P. 167 (1930).
50. The 1930 version of CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §537 stated that "Itihe plaintiff
a . .may have the property of the defendant attached . . . (3) in an action against a
defendant, not residing in this state . . . to recover a sum of money as damages, aris-
ing from an injury to property in this state, in consequence of negligence, fraud, or
other wrongful act."
51. 210 Cal. at 232, 291 P. at 168.
52. See CAL. CODE CI'. PROC. §537(3), supra note 50.
53. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 20, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97.
54. "It is a well-established rule of construction that when a word or phrase has
been given a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be
given the same scope and meaning in other parts or portions of the law, and particu-
larly of the same section thereof." Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Woodhams, 29 Cal. App.
356, 359-60, 156 P. 62, 64 (1916).
55. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1957).
56. See note 2 supra.
57. 49 Cal. 2d at 346, 316 P.2d at 965.
58. id. at 345, 316 P.2d at 965.
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In thus approaching the problem, the court minimized the traditional
emphasis on establishing the situs of intangible property and drew
instead on recent extensions in the law relating to in personam juris-
diction.5"
Interestingly enough, the Turner court did not mention Atkinson.
There are perhaps two reasons for this omission. First, a United States
Supreme Court decision60 soon after Atkinson followed the more tradi-
tional approach and distinguished between the assertion of jurisdiction
based on property situated within a state, and jurisdiction based on
a defendant's contacts with the state. Secondly, the facts of Turner
presented less compelling reasons on which to justify jurisdiction under
the Atkinson approach. In Atkinson the court stressed that the dis-
puted claim arose out of employment in the state, two of the three
defendants were present in the state, and the funds being contested
were subject to immediate removal from the state. In Turner, how-
ever, the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was made out-
side the state, the damage occurred outside the state, there were no
other defendants before the court,6 1 and there was no need for haste
to prevent the dissipation of the property.
Therefore, in order to assert jurisdiction, the Turner court disregarded
the approach of weighing all relevant factors in the litigation and relied
solely on the physical presence of the obligation within the state. In
so doing, the court exercised jurisdiction over a defendant whose con-
tacts with the state were even more minimal than those of the defend-
ants in Atkinson.
The court, by relying solely on its characterization of the insurer's
obligation to defend as property under the California statutes, re-
treated into the more traditional approach to quasi in rem jurisdiction.
This approach, as will become apparent, affords the defendant less
protection than does the weighing approach of Atkinson.
B. Constitutional Limitations on Prejudgment Attachment
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, the United States Su-
preme Court held that in the absence of "extraordinary situations
' 6 2
the prejudgment garnishment of wages which deprived the defendant
of the use of the wages before a defense on the merits of the case
59. See Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAav. L.
REV. 909 (1960).
60. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
61. The insurer is not a defendant nor a party to the action, but is merely a
garnishee of the defendant's property.
62. 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
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was a violation of due process. Some courts have held that Sniadach
applies only to wages as opposed to other property of the defendant.08
The California Supreme Court, however, in Randone v. Appellate De-
partment64 found that the decision was not so limited,06 and held
that Section 537(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure was unconstitu-
tional on its face in that it allowed a defendant to be deprived of
a significant property interest without notice and an opportunity to
be heard.
Nevertheless, the attachment of a defendant's property for the pur-
pose of obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction appears unaffected by the
Sniadach and Randone decisions. The defendant in Sniadach was
a resident of the forum state, and the Court impliedly distinguished
nonresident defendants by emphasizing this fact, noting that "in per-
sonam jurisdiction was readily obtainable." 67  In addition, the Snia-
dach Court cited Ownbey v. Morgan,6  a case allowing a quasi in rem
proceeding against a nonresident defendant, as an example of an extra-
ordinary situation in which a pre-attachment hearing would be unneces-
sary. Several California decisions since Randone69 have, in fact, up-
held the ex parte attachment70 of the property of nonresidents under
due process and equal protection challenges. 71
It has been argued that prejudgment attachments in quasi in rem
proceedings should not be so automatically excluded from the necessity
of pre-attachment hearings. 7  Since the elimination of the hearing
results in the suspension of due process, the exception for extraordinary
situations has been limited to instances involving immediate harm to
63. Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969). But
see Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
64. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
65. California had previously amended the Code of Civil Procedure to exclude
earnings of a defendant from prejudgment attachment. CAL. STATs. 1970, c. 1523,
§2, at 3058.
66. See note 25 supra.
67. 395 U.S. at 339.
68. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
69. The court in Randone noted that since the property of a nonresident de-
fendant subject to attachment by the plaintiff would necessarily consist "of only those
items located outside of the debtor's home state, there [is] less possibility that such
property would include 'necessities' required for day-to-day living; consequently the
resulting hardship to the debtor would frequently be minimized." 5 Cal. 3d at 554,
488 P.2d at 25, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
70. Section 538.5(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550,
§13, at 947, permits prejudgment attachment without notice of hearing when the de-
fendant is a nonresident. A similar provision was included in former Sections 537(2)
and 537(3).
71. Damazo v. MacIntyre, 26 Cal. App. 3d 18, 102 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1972);
Banks v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 143, 102 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1972); Property
Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1972).
72. See Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, YALE
L.J. 1023 (1973).
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a public7" or creditor's74 interest. Thus the reliance of the Sniadach
Court75 on Ownbey v. Morgan76 as precedent for making a blanket
exemption for all prejudgment attachments in quasi in rem proceed-
ings has been criticized.77 Under the facts and the prevailing law
at the time of Ownbey, jurisdiction over the defendant was impossible
without invoking the quasi in rem procedure. Since the existence
of long-arm statutes would now enable a court to exert in personam
jurisdiction over persons who have had the contacts with the forum
state78 as did the defendant in Ownbey, the compelling circumstance
illustrated by that case is obviated.
On the other hand, in cases such as Turner where the quasi in
rem device is the only means by which jurisdiction may be obtained,
the courts would probably be reluctant to eliminate the attachment
procedure from the category of extraordinary situations not subject
to a pre-attachment hearing. A strong argument can be made, how-
ever, that when a defendant's relationship with a state is so tenuous
as to preclude jurisdiction under the minimum contacts approach, the
state has no interest sufficient to justify an assertion of jurisdiction.
When the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction creates the possibility
of unlimited liability on the part of the defendant, as will be discussed
below, the due process question becomes even more substantial.
C. Allowance of a Limited Appearance
New York procedural law at the time of the Seider decision sub-
jected the nonresident defendant to in personam jurisdiction if, after
having his property attached, he appeared in the forum state to defend
the suit on its merits.79 This being the case, a judgment for the plain-
tiff for more than the amount of the policy would bind the defendant
personally for the excess. If the defendant chose not to defend, how-
ever, a default judgment would be entered against him. In this
situation, the insurer might be able to assert against the plaintiff that
he owed no obligation because the defendant-insured had breached
73. See, e.g., Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (economic pro-
tection from a bank's failure during the depression); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberg,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (health protection from misbranded drugs).
74. See, e.g., Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1971) (creditor must prove to the court that the debtor is likely to abscond).
75. The Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), which invalidated a state
replevin statute because of its lack of a pre-attachment hearing, similarly referred to
Ownbey as illustrating such an extraordinary situation.
76. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
77. Note, Quasi in Rem Juisdiction, supra note 72, at 1029-32.
78. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
79- N.Y. CPLR §320(c), as amended, IU. CONF. 1965, PROPOSAL No. 3.
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his contractual duty to cooperate.8 0 Therefore, in cases where the
amount claimed exceeded the limits of the policy, the Seider procedure
could, in the words of Judge Friendly, "[p]roduce either a constitu-
tionally unacceptable result or a nullity."8'
The New York Court of Appeals in denying reargument in Simpson
v. Loehmann,8 2 however, interpreted the applicable rule to protect the
defendant from personal liability even when he defends on the merits.83
This interpretation was subsequently codified by an amendment to
the rule,84 thereby allowing the defendant to make a limited appear-
ance to defend the case with liability restricted to the coverage of
the policy.
Under similar circumstances, the California courts afford the de-
fendant no such protection. The general rule was set forth in In
re Clarke: "[If [a party] appears and asks for any relief which
could only be given . . . in a pending case, or which itself would
be a regular proceeding in the case, it is a general appearance no
matter how carefully or expressly it may be stated that the appearance
is special."8 5 Thus while the defendant may make a special appear-
ance to contest the attachment or garnishment,8" any further action
to defend the case on the merits is a general appearance which subjects
the defendant to personal liability.
87
The practical effect of the present California law is that the attach-
ment of the defendant's property actually results in the plaintiff obtain-
ing in personam jurisdiction whenever the defendant attempts to de-
fend his case on the merits. The defendant is forced to make a
choice. He may permit his property to be lost by default, or he may
submit himself to liability beyond the value of the property whether
or not his contacts with the forum state are sufficient to sustain in
personam jurisdiction.88
80. Generally, the failure of the insured to cooperate is a defense that the insurer
may assert against the injured party. 8 J. APPLEM N, INSURANCE LAv AND PRACTICa
§4817, at 195 (1962).
81. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1968).
82. 21 N.Y.2d 990, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 238 N.E.2d 319 (1968).
83. This interpretation of the existing statute was termed "miraculous" and "a
shock" by Professor Siegel. Siegel, supra note 4, at 34-35.
84. N.Y. CPLR §320(c), as amended, Jun. CONF. 1969, PROPOSAL No. 1, eff.
Sept. 1, 1969. While Judge Friendly found the Simpson court's interpretation some-
thing less than a miracle, 410 F.2d at 111, the dispute becomes academic with the
amendment.
85. 125 Cal. 388, 312, 58 P. 22, 23 (1899).
86. Root v. Superior Court, 209 CaL App. 2d 242, 246, 25 Cal. Rptr. 784,
786-87 (1962).
87. 1 WrrmN, CALnoRNA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction §118 (2d ed. 1970).
88. It is difficult to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction on the ground
that the defendant, by his appearance, "consented" to it (see note 14 supra) when his
sole alternative was to lose his property. See Taintor, Foreign Judgment In Rem:
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The unfairness of placing a defendant in such a predicament has
been recognized by commentators 9 and by some courts,90 including
the court in Simpson v. Loehmann. The Restatement of Judgments
is in accord and takes the position that a defendant in a quasi in
rem proceeding does not subject himself to in personam jurisdiction
if he so states when he contests the validity of a claim.91
Opponents of the limited appearance argue that limiting judgments
to the value of the property attached would lead to a multiplicity of
litigation.92 A plaintiff whose claim was not fully satisfied from the
garnished property could bring a subsequent action in a forum where
personal jurisdiction was obtainable. Such a possibility is outweighed,
however, by the necessity of allowing the defendant adequate oppor-
tunity to defend his property. It might well be argued, in fact, that
under a policy of limited liability a plaintiff who is able to pursue
his defendant into another forum would be likely to initiate the action
there to avoid the inconvenience of bringing two actions.
The Turner court gave implicit approval to the allowance of a lim-
ited appearance. In denying defendant Evers' motion to quash the
attachment,93 the court cited both Minichiella v. Rosenberg94 and
the Restatement of Judgments and stated that "under the more recent
authorities [the defendant] may still defend on the merits of the claim
without submitting himself to personal jurisdiction . . . If the de-
fendant remains apprehensive that a judgment against him may be
given an in personam effect, he should be able to protect himself by
appropriate recitals therein."'95 This broad assumption that other Cali-
Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata in Personam, 8 U. PriT. L. REv. 223, 225-26
(1942).
89. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at 954-55. See also Green,
Jurisdictional Reform in California, 21 HAST. IJ. 1219, 1225 (1970); Taintor, supra
note 88, at 225-26.
90. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 F. 214, 218-19
(6th Cir. 1922); Miller Bros. v. State, 210 Md. 535, 95 A.2d 286, 292 (1953), rev'd
on other grounds, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass.
14, 112 N.E. 500, 502 (1916).
91. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §40 (1942).
92. Note, Effect of a General Appearance to the In Rem Cause in a Quasi in
Rem Action, 25 IowA L. REV. 329, 335 (1940).
93. The motion was treated as a motion to quash the attachment, even though
in his motion defendant Evers challenged both in personam and quasi in rem juris-
diction over him, and the plaintiff's complaint and summons were both in the statutory
form generally applicable to in personam jurisdiction. The court reasoned that if the
motion were granted because of the lack of personal jurisdiction, a fact conceded by
the plaintiffs, the court would also lose quasi in rein jurisdiction. 31 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. at 14-15, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13. Thus the court interpreted CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. §418.10(a)(1) as permitting a defendant to object to jurisdiction over him or
his property.
94. The Minichiello case offers a clear explanation of the Simpson interpretation
of N.Y. CPLR §320(c) and expresses support for it.
95. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 16, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94.
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fornia courts will follow the lead of Simpson, however, ignores the
substantial case law to the contrary. 96
If California is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents on the basis
of the Seider attachment procedure, it should afford the defendant
the same protection provided by New York7 through legislation al-
lowing him the opportunity to defend his claim without becoming per-
sonally liable for an amount in excess of the value of the property
attached.
D. Forum Non Conveniens as a Means of Alleviating Hardships of
a Defendant
Even if the constitutionality of the Seider rule continues to be up-
held,98 and even if a defendant over whom jurisdiction is so obtained
is afforded the protection of a limited appearance, the possibility re-
mains that he will be subjected to great hardship in defending his
interests in property many miles from his home state. In Minichiello,
Judge Friendly recognized this possibility and answered by noting
that since Seider cases necessarily include a diversity of citizenship
and often involve claims exceeding $10,000, they will usually be
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Once the case is properly
before the federal court, the provisions of Title 28 of the United States
Code, Section 1404(a), become applicable, allowing the court to
transfer the action to the district where the defendant resides or
where an incident material to the action occurred when such a transfer
would be "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the inter-
est of justice." Thus a defendant greatly inconvenienced by defending
a Seider action could supposedly remove the case to a federal court 9
and then under Section 1404(a), move for a transfer to a more
convenient forum.
96. 1 WrrxMN, CALIFORNU PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction §125 (2d ed. 1970).
97. N.Y. CPLR §320(c), in relevant part, provides that "[wihen the court's
jurisdiction is not based upon personal service on the defendant, an appearance is not
equivalent to personal service upon the defendant: 1..... if jurisdiction is based
solely upon a levy on defendant's property within the state pursuant to an order of
attachment."
98. Although several states have refused to adopt the Seider rule (see note 24
supra), it has never been held unconstitutional. Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,
411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969); Minichiello v. Rosen-
berg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Victor v. Lyon
Associates, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 695, 287 N.Y.S.2d 424, 234 N.E.2d 459 (1967), appeal dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question, 392 U.S. 8 (1968). Section 410.10
of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or
of the United States." Thus, as Judge Goldberg points out in Turner, "if New York
has jurisdiction in a Seider type case, so does California." 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 17,
107 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
99. 28 U.S.C. §1441 (1970).
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An evaluation of the adequacy of Section 1404(a) in protecting
the interests of a Seider defendant requires a brief examination of
its history and application. The statute is based on forum non conven-
lens. The purpose of this common law doctrine was to foster the
selection of the most appropriate forum by allowing a court to forego
the assertion of its constitutional grant of jurisdiction.100 The factors
to be considered by the court in determining when the doctrine
should be applied are generally recognized to include both the private
interests of the parties, such as the accessibility of evidence and wit-
nesses, and the interests of the public, such as the impositon of jury
duty on a community unrelated to the litigation. 10
In balancing the interests of the litigants, however, the greatest
weight was usually given to those of the plaintiff. A statement of
Justice Jackson in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert accurately describes the
application of the doctrine: "[J]nless the balance is strongly in favor
of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be dis-
turbed."' .2 Clearly, the defendant is faced with a heavy burden to
carry his motion of dismissal.
The cases of Gulf Oil and Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co.'103 illustrate the weight of this burden. In Gulf Oil neither
the plaintiff nor the defendant resided in New York where the action
was brought. Indeed the only reasons for using that forum were that
the plaintiff's attorney lived there and a fear that the amount sought
would stagger the local jury where the incident occurred. The Court
in Koster applied the doctrine in a derivative suit brought in New
York by a New York plaintiff against an Illinois corporation and sev-
eral individual defendants, all residents of Illinois. The Court em-
phasized the high significance 0 4 ordinarily placed on allowing the
plaintiff to bring suit in his home forum.'0 5 Nevertheless, the exis-
100. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947), the principle was
thus stated: "[A] court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdic-
tion is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute."
101. Id. at 508-09. See also Comment, The Proper Role of the Residence Factor
in Forum Non Conveniens Motions, 45 So. CAL. L. Ray. 249 (1972); Note, Forum
Non Conveniens in California: Code of Civil Procedure Section 410.30, 21 HAST. L.J.
1245 (1970).
102. 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
103. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
104. 330 U.S. at 525, citing International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transportation
Co., 292 U.S. 511, 520 (1934).
105. When there are only two parties to a dispute, there is good reason
why it should be tried in the plaintiff's home forum if that has been his
choice. He should not be deprived of the presumed advantages of his home
jurisdiction except upon a clear showing of facts which either (1) establish
such oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant as to be out of all proportion
to plaintiff's convenience, . ... or (2) make trial in the chosen forum inap-
propriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative
and legal problems. In any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of
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tence of many potential plaintiffs, the location of the evidence in the
defendant's home forum, and the fact that the plaintiff showed no
substantial convenience in the choice of forum combined to outweigh
that significance.
It has been asserted that Section 1404(a) is not simply a codification
of the forum non conveniens doctrine, but that its purpose is to grant
a broader application of transfer for the convenience of the parties,100
permitting a change of forum in situations not sufficient under the
common law doctrine. Certainly the federal statute is procedurally
more convenient. It allows for the automatic transfer to another fed-
eral court,10" whereas the common law doctrine requires a dismissal
and a new suit. 08 The relative ease of this procedure should be a
strong factor in favor of leniency in granting the motion, 00 but
the courts have not universally followed this policy. 10 A strong pre-
sumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum still exists.
Forum non conveniens became codified in California with the addi-
tion of Section 410.30 to the Code of Civil Procedure. The statute,
which became effective July 1, 1970, provides:
When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds
that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard
in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the ac-
tion in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.
In his Turner decision, Judge Goldberg relies on this new statute as
an escape hatch from "the obvious and real danger in cases of this
sort that there may be an 'overly enthusiastic but not unconstitutional
assertion of jurisdiction' . . . .'" Goldberg noted with approval the
recent New York case of Silver v. Great American Insurance Com-
pany12 which purported to relax the New York rule proscribing a
convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally
outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown.
330 U.S. at 524.
106. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); Jiffy Lubricator Co., Inc. v.
Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360, 362 (4th Cir. 1949).
107. When the transfer is made pursuant to defendant's motion, the law of the
forum chosen by the plaintiff is applied in the new forum. Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612 (1964).
108. See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REv. 380,
386-93 (1947).
109. The court in Amalgamated Ass'n v. Southern Bus Lines, Inc., 172 F.2d 946,
948 (5th Cir. 1949), stated that "[t]ransfer is a less drastic matter than dismissal,
for it involves no loss of time or pleading or costs; and no doubt a broader discretion
may be exercised in ordering it."
110. Compare Leesona Corp. v. Duplan Corp., 317 F. Supp. 290 (R.I. 1970)
with Beach v. National Football League, 331 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Savoia
Film S.A.I. v. Vanguard Films, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Ferguson v. Ford
Motor Co., 89 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
111. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 24, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 399, citing Minichiello v.
Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 119 (2d Cir. 1968).
112. 29 N.Y.2d 356, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 278 N.E.2d 619 (1972).
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forum non conveniens dismissal when either party to the suit resided
in the forum. The Silver court stated that the expansion of jurisdic-
tion such as that inherent in Seider "requires a greater degree of for-
bearance in accepting suits which have but a minimal contact with
New York."'1 3
At this time it is questionable whether the California statute will
provide the forbearance that Judge Goldberg advocates. It has been
suggested that the new statute merely codifies the doctrine of forum
non conveniens as previously applied in this state. 114  If this is in
fact the case, the statute will be of little help to the nonresident de-
fendant in an action instigated under the Seider procedure because
the California courts have closely followed the common law practice
of denying the motion for dismissal when the plaintiff is a California
resident.115
The leading case of Thomson v. Continental Insurance Company"6
illustrates this approach in its extreme. A California resident brought
suit in the Superior Court for Los Angeles County against two insur-
ance companies, alleging breach of contract and civil conspiracy for
their refusal to settle a claim for property damage in Texas. A prev-
ious suit by the plaintiff had been transferred from a California to
a Texas federal court pursuant to defendant's motion under Section
1404(a) and was apparently abandoned. The California Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens in spite of the facts
that the federal suit was pending in Texas, the insurance policies were
issued in Texas, the alleged acts had occurred in Texas, and the prop-
erty was in Texas, as were six of the seven witnesses whom the de-
fendant intended to call. The seventh witness resided in Mississippi.
In reversing, the court cited the common law view that the forum
non conveniens doctrine is rarely applied when the plaintiff is a resi-
dent of the state, attributing this limitation to California's policy of
protecting the interests of its residents.
One of the few cases to present the question to the California courts
since the enactment of the statute is Great Northern Railway Co. v.
Superior Court."7 The court in that case granted a writ of mandamus
compelling the trial court to dismiss a wrongful death action on forum
113. Id. at 362, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 403, 278 N.E.2d at 622.
114. Ryan & Berger, Forum Non Conveniens in California, 1 PAC. L.J. 532, 533
(1970); Comment, The Proper Role of the Residence Factor, supra note 101, at 250.
115. Goodwine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 481, 407 P.2d 1, 47 Cal. Rptr. 201
(1965); see also Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954).
116. 66 Cal. 2d 738, 427 P.2d 765, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1967).
117. 12 Cal. App. 3d 105, 90 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1970).
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non conveniens grounds. Under the facts of the case, however, the
plaintiff was not a resident of California, and the accident did not
occur there. The suit was brought under the Federal Employer's Li-
ability Act1s against Great Northern Railway Company whose only
contact with California was a few miles of track. Pursuant to that
Act, which permits filing in any state where the defendant is doing
business at the time the cause of action arises,"1 9 the suit was properly
commenced in California. The plaintiff's California attorneys ap-
pointed their employee, also a California resident, as administratrix
of the deceased's estate. The latter became the nominal plaintiff in
the suit. In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court
considered twenty-five "legitimate" factors, including the presence of
all witnesses in Washington, the accessibility of evidence in Washing-
ton, the increased expense of maintaining the action in California,
the relative lack of California's interest in the litigation, and, in view
of this lack of interest, the burden that would be placed on local courts,
taxpayers, and jurors.
The significance of the decision lies in the court's reference to the
newly enacted statute as a codification of the principle of forum non
conveniens as established in pre-statute cases. 120 The court reiterated
the rule that "the principle of forum non conveniens will not ordinarily
apply when; the plaintiff is a resident of the state .... ,,121 The
case at bar was distinguished in that the resident plaintiff was not
the real party in interest, but merely an administratrix of the estate
of a nonresident decedent. The language of the case thus suggests
that had the decedent's widow been a resident of California, the mo-
tion to dismiss would have been denied despite the remaining con-
siderations in favor of the defendant. 22  The indication is, therefore,
that Section 410.30 has as yet had little effect on the courts' policy
of considering the plaintiff's residence a conclusive factor in denying
forum non conveniens motions.
The major justification for this policy is the state's interest in pro-
tecting the welfare of its residents by assuring them redress for their
grievances. 23 Moreover, when the situation involves the attachment
of a nonresident's property, it is felt that if it is convenient for the
118. 45 U.S.C. §51 et seq. (1970).
119. 45 U.S.C. §56 (1970).
120. 12 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
121. Id. at 111, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
122. While there was a great deal of overlap among the twenty-five factors con-
sidered by the court, twenty-three were found to support dismissal and two were given
neutral weight. Id. at 113-15, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 466-67.
123. Thomson v. Continental Insurance Co., 66 Cal. 2d 738, 742-43, 427 P.2d 765,
768, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104 (1967).
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defendant "to hold and maintain property within the state, it should
be convenient to defend that property within the state when the need
arises."' 24
The facts of Turner require a reconsideration of both these lines
of reasoning. When the property attached is that of an obligation
under an insurance policy, the latter argument is weakened consider-
ably. A person who obtains liability insurance coverage has no control
over where his insurer does business. Other than the fact that he
associated himself with the particular insurance company, it cannot
be said that he voluntarily became a holder of property within the
state. His voluntary association can be given little weight since it
is well known that most insurance companies do business in many
states.
As to the state's acknowledged interest in seeing that the grievances
of its citizens are litigated, it would seem appropriate to consider the
degree of that interest in relation to the type and seriousness of the
plaintiff's injury. The effect on the state is likely to be greater, for
example, when a resident receives an injury to his person than when
he sustains (as did the Turner plaintiffs) damage to property. The
adoption of the Seider procedure for obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction
thus demands a flexible application of the forum non conveniens stat-
ute in which the residence of the plaintiff is given serious consideration,
but is not made the determinative factor. 125 Such an approach would
preserve the state's legitimate interest in protecting its residents while
preventing extreme hardships on defendants when the state's interest
in the litigation is minimal.
In view of the early indications of judicial reluctance to depart from
the traditional policy of allowing the plaintiff's residence to be con-
clusive in disallowing forum non conveniens motions, it appears that
this flexible approach will not be achieved without legislative action.
At least one amendment to Section 410.30 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure has been proposed. 126 It reads:
The domicile or residence in this state of any party to the action
shall not preclude the court from staying or dismissing such action.
124. Root v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 2d 242, 247, 25 Cal. Rptr. 784, 788
(1962).
125. It has been suggested that the expanding bases of personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents as a result of long-arm statutes likewise require a less inflexible approach
to forum non conveniens. Silver v. Great American Insurance Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356,
328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 278 N.E.2d 619, 622 (1972); Homburger & Laufer, Expanding
Jurisdiction over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm
Statute, 16 BuFrALO L. REV. 67, 73-75 (1966).
126. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, ATroaRNY's GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA JUR-
ISDIMCON AND PROCESS §1.8, at 46-47 (1970).
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The addition of this provision would encourage the straightforward bal-
ancing of all applicable factors' 27 bearing on the state's interest in
litigating a particular case and should be adopted by the legislature
if the Turner decision is ultimately upheld. This balancing approach
would serve to prevent abuses of the Turner attachment procedure,
but would not tip the scales so far toward the defendant as to abrogate
the whole purpose for invoking the procedure.
It has been suggested that the codification of forum non conveniens
separate from Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
allows initial jurisdiction in any manner "not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States," will discourage
courts from considering factors similar to those of forum non con-
veniens in their initial decision to assert jurisdiction. 128 The result
would be the granting of jurisdiction whenever it was constitutionally
permissible and a later dismissal under forum non conveniens if ap-
propriate. This conjecture is precisely the approach followed by the
Turner court. 129  Thus the codification of forum non conveniens may
actually facilitate the acceptance of the Seider procedure in California.
Once jurisdiction is obtained, a stay or dismissal would be granted
only when maintenance of the action in the plaintiff's choice of forum
would defeat "substantial justice."'130
THE ALLOWANCE OF A DIRECT ACTION AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE SEIDER PROCEDURE
Since under the Seider procedure the attachment of the obligations
results in the insurer's having to defend in the ensuing litigation, it
has been proposed that the procedure is, in fact, a judicially created
direct action' 3' against the insurer. Direct actions are statutorily pre-
cluded in a majority of states.132 The principal reason for this policy
is the same as that for disallowing references to insurance in negli-
127. For a list of factors proposed by the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act, see id. at 42.
128. Note, Forum Non Conveniens in California, supra note 101, at 1255-56.
129. See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
130. CAL. CODE Cxv. PROC. §410.10.
131. Although many states require that an insurer subject itself to suit by an
injured party once a judgment has been obtained against the person insured under the
policy, the term "direct action" refers to a suit by an injured party directly against the
insurer before the liability of the insured is established. See Note, Direct-Action
Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict of Law Problems, 74 HIv. L. REv. 357
(1960).
132. Only Louisiana, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, and Arkansas have statutes per-
mitting direct actions by an injured party. The Louisiana statute is the broadest, allov-
ing a direct action against any liability insurer doing business in the state so long as
the accident occurs within Louisiana. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §22:655, as amended,
AcTs 1962, no. 471, §1; see Note, Direct-Action Statutes, supra note 131, at 357.
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gence actions 33 -a jury will be prone to consider the assets of an
insurance company, in comparison with those of an individual defend-
ant, as virtually unlimited and will therefore be disposed to find lia-
bility and to return unduly high verdicts.134
The court in Seider skirted the contention that the attachment actu-
ally created a direct action against the insurer, stating that the insurer
was required to defend in New York not because of the attachment,
but because of its agreement to defend in any forum where an action
is properly brought against the insured.1 35 In the cases following
Seider, the courts conceded that the attachment procedure did amount
to a direct action, but justified this result on the ground that New
York could, if it so desired, enact a statute allowing direct actions
against insurers doing business in the state.130 Whether or not this
conclusion is constitutionally correct depends upon the weight given
to the state's interest in protecting its residents.
The case upon which the New York courts base their conclusion
is that of Watson v. Employers Liability Corp. S in which the Su-
preme Court upheld a Louisiana statute 3 8 authorizing direct actions
against all insurers doing business in the state even though the poli-
cies were issued in other states forbidding direct actions. The statute
in question, however, applied only to accidents or injuries that oc-
curred within Louisiana, and the Court in sustaining the statute em-
phasized that Louisiana's interests in the litigation were substantial.
It was pointed out, for example, that plaintiffs injured in Louisiana
would likely use the medical facilities and perhaps the financial re-
sources of Louisiana. It was further noted that Louisiana would be
the most convenient forum for trial of such cases, presumably because
of the proximity of evidence and witnesses.
The first of these considerations could be proffered in support of
allowing a direct action by a state resident when personally injured
outside the state. A resident, even though injured elsewhere, would
undoubtedly have to call upon the resources of his home state in recov-
133. Akin v. Lee, 206 N.Y. 20, 99 N.E. 85 (1912); Simpson v. Foundation Co.,
201 N.Y. 479, 95 N.E. 10 (1911).
134. See Note, The Liability Insurer as a Real Party in Interest: Proposed Amend-
ments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MINN. L. REv. 784, 788 (1957).
135. 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102, 216 N.E.2d at 315.
136. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1968); Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 314, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 639, 234 N.E.2d 669, 673 (1968)
(concurring opinion). In Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577,
204 N.E.2d 622 (1965), the New York Court of Appeals allowed the application of
Puerto Rico's direct action statute in a suit brought by a New York resident injured in
Puerto Rico when the insurer was doing business in New York.
137. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
138. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §22:655, as amended, AcTs 1950, no. 541, §1.
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ering from his disability. Convenience considerations, on the other
hand, would tend to lessen the interests of the plaintiff's home state
when the accident occurred outside its borders. It is most probable
that much of the evidence and a majority of the witnesses other than
the plaintiff himself would be located nearer the situs of the accident.
The Court in Watson also considered the fact that without the direct
action against the insurer the Louisiana plaintiff would have been un-
able to try her case other than by going to the home state of the
alleged tortfeasor or to the state where the insurance policy was is-
sued.'8 9 Thus a significant weight seems to have been placed on
the personal convenience of the plaintiff in being able to sue in her
home state. The same situation exists, of course, when the accident
occurs outside the state of plaintiff's residence. Thus the Watson
case does offer some authority for allowing plaintiffs to bring direct
actions against insurers doing business in the state on the basis of
residency alone.
In addition, the Watson Court cites the 1935 case of Alaska Packers
Association v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n.140  In this case California was
permitted to apply its workmen's compensation statute to aid an indi-
gent laborer who, though he was injured in Alaska, became incapaci-
tated in California and unable to leave the state. The Court in Alaska
Packers noted the "grave concern" of California when the plaintiff
would otherwise be remediless and would be likely to draw on the
public resources of the state.' 41 This case lends further support
to the conclusion that a state's interests in its residents would justify
the enactment of a direct action statute when the cause of action arose
outside the state.
Judge Goldberg in his Turner opinion denies that the garnishment
of the insurer's obligations is a direct action against the insurer.141
The insurer, he states, is not a party to the action but is merely a
garnishee, and garnishment of the insurer's obligations under the policy
is not proscribed under the California statute. This argument is logi-
cally correct. Insurance Code Section 11580(b) states that a liability
insurance policy 43 must provide that when "a judgment is secured
139. The defendant tortfeasor alleged that it had no agent in Louisiana upon whom
process could be served. 348 U.S. at 72.
140. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
141. Id. at 542.
142. 'This is not a direct action against the insurer, because it is not an action
against the insurer." 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 22, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
143. Since the Washington contract in question was not before the Turner court,
it was assumed from the plaintiff's reference to a "liability . . . contractual obliga-
tion" and from the way the case was presented that the policy was within the meaning
of Insurance Code Section 11580 and that California law would apply. See CAL.
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against the insured . . . then an action may be brought against the
insurer on the policy and subject to its terms and limitations, by such
judgment creditor to recover on the judgment." Since a garnishment
is not an action against the insurer, it is not subject to a prior judg-
ment against the insured as required by the above provision. More-
over, once the garnishment has been properly accomplished, the in-
surer, as garnishee, is directly liable to the plaintiff.'44 Thus assuming
that the policy obligation, is properly garnished as property of the
defendant, the procedure authorized by Turner is not violative of the
provisions of Section 11580.
The fact remains, however, that the effect of the procedure is the
same as a prejudgment action brought directly against the insurer.
The insurer is required to defend the action and in doing so may
assert any defenses it may have against the insured.'45 Since Califor-
nia could, if the analysis of the dicta in Simpson and Minichiello is
valid, enact a direct action statute, at least in instances of personal
injury, the latter procedure recommends itself as a better means for
permitting a plaintiff to litigate in his home state when jurisdiction
over the insured is otherwise unobtainable.
In a direct action the defendant is the insurer and will necessarily
be doing business within the state. Thus the most obvious advan-
tage of a direct action is that it eliminates the possibilities of subjecting
the nonresident insured to personal liability or undue hardship on the
basis of an attachment simply because it eliminates the need for an
attachment. Further, a direct action, in contrast to a Seider type
procedure, provides more protection to the insurer. As the defendant
in the action, it may interpose defenses of the insured, 14 6 thereby pre-
cluding the possibility that the insured, by defaulting, might subject
it to uncontested liability.
147
As mentioned above, the chief policy objection to direct actions
Evm. CoDE §311(a) which provides that when the law of another state is applicable
and cannot be determined, the law of this state can be applied if to do so is consistent
with the Constitutions of California and the United States.
144. All persons having in their possession, or under their control, any credits
or other personal property.. . at the time of service upon them of a copy of
the writ and notice, as provided in this chapter, shall be ... liable to the
plaintiff for the amount of such credits [or] property ...until the attach-
ment or garnishment be released or discharged or any judgment recovered by
him be satisfied.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §544. See also Boyle v. Hawkins, 71 Cal. 2d 229, 238-39,
455 P.2d 97, 103, 78 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (1969).
145. 8 J. APP. mAN, INSuRAN CE LAW AND PRACrICE §4813 et seq. (1962).
146. Id. §4812, at 175.
147. The insurer's only defense in such a situation would be the insured's breach
of the cooperation clause, but in California the insurer must also show that it was
substantially prejudiced by the failure of the insurer to cooperate. Billington v. Inter-
insurance Exchange, 71 CaL 2d 728, 456 P.2d 982, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1969).
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has been the attempt to keep recovery to a reasonable figure by with-
holding the existence of insurance coverage from the jury. It is hard
to justify this secrecy in a time when most jury members are themselves
covered by insurance policies, when minimum automobile insurance
coverage is compulsory, and when evidence of insurance coverage
is often admitted on a collateral issue.14  It has been proposed, in
fact, that a recognition of insurance coverage can be of benefit to
an insurer by allowing to make known the social and economic ef-
fects of high verdicts. 149  With the dissipation of the reason behind
the rule, it should no longer be a bar to direct action legislation.
There appear to be no additional policy reasons in California to
preclude the enactment of a direct action statute. In fact, direct ac-
tions are permitted when the clear intent of the policy, or the statute
or ordinance pursuant to which it is issued, is that the benefit inures
to a third party or parties.' 50 This is often the case when public
carriers obtain insurance as a condition to doing business in a particu-
lar locality. Anyone sustaining injury to his person or property by
such carrier may sue the surety directly or join it as a party defendant
in the action.' 5' The California courts have long recognized the
"quasi-public" nature of insurance, 52 and thus it would be in keeping
with the general policy of the state to extend protection a step further
by allowing a direct action against the insurer when an injured resi-
dent has no other means of litigating the issues in California. 15
CONCLUSION
Quasi in rem proceedings are instituted by a plaintiff who has no
148. Evidence of insurance coverage is admissible, for example, to prove owner-
ship, to show the existence of an agency relationship, or to impeach the credibility of a
witness. Note, The Liability Insurer as a Real Party in Interest, supra note 134, at
788-89.
149. See Note, Direct-Action Statutes, supra note 131, at 358-59.
150. See Gibbons v. Travelers Ins. Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 819, 79 Cal. Rptr. 438
(1969); Spencer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 152 CaL App. 2d 797, 313 P.2d 900
(1957); Chamberlin v. Los Angeles, 92 Cal. App. 2d 330, 206 P.2d 661 (1949).
151. Giordano v. American Fidel. & Cas. Co., 97 Cal. App. 2d 309, 217 P.2d 444
(1950); Connell v. Clark, 88 Cal. App. 2d 941, 200 P.2d 26 (1948); Grier v. Ferrant,
62 Cal. App. 2d 306, 144 P.2d 631 (1944); Fraher v. Eisenmann, 94 Cal. App. 48,
270 P. 704 (1928). In Milliron v. Dittman, 180 Cal. 443, 181 P. 779 (1919), the
argument that the jury might be expected to return a larger verdict when the insurar
appeared as a party defendant was rejected. The court stated that the jury must be
presumed to know of the insurance since the statute requiring it was of public record
and that the insurer undoubtedly took this into account in fixing its charges.
152. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 673, 456 P.2d 674,
684, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 116 (1969); Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10
Cal. App. 3d 376, 403-04, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970); California State Auto Ass'n
Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Downey, 96 Cal. App. 2d 876, 899, 216 P.2d 882, 896 (1950);
Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 139 Cal. App. 577, 580, 34 P.2d 731, 732 (1934).
153. See Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back into
Its Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 660, 670-86 (1971), for a section-by-section discussion
of a proposed direct action statute.
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means of obtaining jurisdiction in personam over a defendant. The
defendant's only contact with the plaintiff's resident state is the exist-
ence within it of property belonging to him. Because of the recent
extensions of personal jurisdiction over defendants who have even min-
imal contacts with a state,' the use of quasi in rem proceedings
has been criticized as being anachronistic and an unfair method of
forcing any defendant to litigate in a foreign forum.155 Certainly when
the property attached in order to obtain the jurisdiction is an obliga-
tion under a policy of insurance, this contention has more merit than
when the defendant has voluntarily acquired or placed property within
the state's boundaries. The existence of the obligation within the
plaintiff's reach is due not to the defendant's own act nor even his
intent, but to the fortuitous circumstance that his insurer does business
there. 1
6
An important justification for permitting the procedure is the state's
interest in seeing that its injured residents who have no other means
of obtaining relief are able to litigate their claims. To protect this
interest at all costs, however, tramples the rights of defendants. The
California Supreme Court brought this problem sharply into focus in
Atkinson v. Superior Court'57 when, before asserting quasi in rem
jurisdiction, it considered the contacts of all the parties involved in
a manner similar to that used in the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion. In other words, considerations of "traditional . .. fair play
and substantial justice' 58 were entertained before the initial exercise
of jurisdiction.
The effect of the Atkinson approach is to blur the distinctions be-
tween in personam and quasi in rem jurisdiction, pointing the way
to the eventual demise of these distinctions. This is the result advo-
cated by some commentators' 59 and is not far from reality in many
situations. For example, since quasi in rem proceedings result in per-
sonal liability after a defense on the merits, 60 a distinction from in
personam jurisdiction is, to a defendant who so defends, nominal at
best. The weighing approach of Atkinson affords him more protection.
154. See Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 59.
155. See Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv.
L. REv. 303 (1962).
156. The same argument can be made, of course, when, under the doctrine of
Harris v. Balk (see notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text), a debt owing to the
defendant is garnished wherever his debtor happens to be personally present.
157. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
158. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), citing
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
159. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at 956-66. See also Carring-
ton, supra note 155.
160. See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
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The Turner court, however, chose not to follow the Atkinson ap-
proach. It based jurisdiction on the characterization of the policy
obligation as property of the defendant. The obligation was undis-
puted and was properly attached. The court noted the plaintiffs' alle-
gation that the smallness of the claim precluded their bringing the
action in another forum and reiterated the state's interest in protect-
ing its residents. There was no suggestion that the state's interest
is any less when injury occurs to plaintiffs' property rather than to
their persons. The court also noted the possible hardship to the de-
fendant in having to litigate a minor contractual claim in a distant
forum. The seriousness of this hardship was somewhat discounted,
however, under the reasoning that liability could be imposed "only
to the extent of the assets attached. ' 161 While this contention is true
under the facts of the case,' 62 it ignores the very real possibility of
personal liability when the plaintiff's recovery exceeds the value of
the property attached.
The court then concluded that the competing interests of the parties
need not be reconciled in order to assert jurisdiction because if the
maintenance of the action were unfair to the defendant, the suit could
later be dismissed under the forum non conveniens statute. This
conclusion ignores the judicial policy of disallowing forum non con-
veniens dismissals when the plaintiff is a resident of the state. 03
Thus under the present law of California, the exercise of quasi in
rem jurisdiction may enable a plaintiff to bind a defendant personally
to an amount in excess of the property attached. Coupled with the
difficulty of obtaining a forum non conveniens dismissal when the
plaintiff is a state resident, the wisdom, if not the constitutionality,
of basing this jurisdiction on the attachment of an obligation of an
insurer doing business in the state is questionable. Both of these due
process impediments can be alleviated by judicial reinterpretation of
case law or, as this comment suggests, by legislative action.
Another means of allowing a resident plaintiff to litigate his claim
when personal jurisdiction over the wrongdoer cannot be obtained is
the amendment of Insurance Code Section 11580 to permit, in this
limited situation, a direct action against the insurer. In addition to
its own defenses against the insured, the insurer, as the defendant
in the direct action, may interpose any defenses of the insured
against the plaintiff. The insurer is thus protected from the possible
161. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 24, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
162. The plaintiffs in Turner stipulated that their recovery not exceed $5,000, a
sum presumably far below the value of the policy.
163. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
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imposition of uncontested liability by a defaulting policyholder. In
view of this additional element of control of the litigation, a direct
action should be less objectionable to the insurer than the attachment
of the policy obligation as a means of invoking its duty to defend.
The statutory allowance of a direct action would foster the state's
interest in protecting its residents while obviating the necessity of a
defendant having to defend in a forum perhaps far from his own
residence. Since it would also offer to the insurer a small degree
of protection not provided by the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
over the insured, it is proposed that California enact legislation to
allow a direct action as an alternative to the attachment procedure
authorized by Seider and Turner.
Mary Ann Villwock
